ABSTRACT Empirical studies of legislative representation often reach conflicting conclusions about the degree to which legislators reflect the voters' preferences. Given the importance of representation as a keystone of democracy, these results demand explanation. I argue that these conflicting results stem from scholars' failure to adequately account for the complexity of the representation process. Specifically, scholars generally account for neither the indirect influences on legislator behavior nor control for obvious rival hypotheses when evaluating the efficacy of the representation process. The results demonstrate that personal, party and constituent preferences all influence legislators' decisions either directly or indirectly.
Introduction
A central question of legislative scholarship examines why quantitative studies of representation often reach contradictory results. 1 In many studies the results appear to turn on the specification of the model and the operationalization of the variables. 2 Generally, models that omit proxies for legislator ideology find that constituency drives legislator voting. 3 Conversely, models that include roll call vote based measures of ideology tend to find that legislators act on them. 4 These conflicting results lead Congress watchers to question the methods by which representation scholars test their hypotheses. 5 Conflicting conclusions about legislator responsiveness may stem from failure to adequately account for rival hypotheses. 6 In particular, representation studies often omit important variables or measure them poorly. Additionally, few studies account for indirect influences on legislator behavior.
The lack of consensus on this question can be largely attributed to problems operationalizing and specifying the relationship among variables and an inability to accurately measure variables such as legislator ideology. 7 Further, scholars seldom account for indirect influences on legislator behavior. 8 These problems lead to results that exaggerate the role of legislator ideology relative to the influence of constituency on legislator behavior. In the process, the richness of the representation process is overlooked.
I argue that studies of Congressional representation reach inconsistent results because scholars use overly simplistic models. I address these specification and measurement problems in two ways. First, problems of model specification are addressed using a Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) framework. SEM allows for both development of a causal model and analysis of latent variables (via factor analysis) in a system of equations. Using a regression format, it also overcomes the correlation related problems that plague path analysis in this field of research. 9 Thus, SEM allows for the simultaneous evaluation of the various influences on legislative representation. 10 Second,
I address measurement problems and incorporate rival hypotheses into the representation model. The results show that both constituent and personal preferences influence legislator behavior.
This research examines legislative representation to develop a conceptual model reflecting these several hypotheses. Then I operationalize these variables to develop a statistical model. The results show that failure to account for the relationships among independent variables, and measurement of latent variables leads to incomplete results.
These incomplete results are consistent with the conflicting findings observed in past research. I conclude that constituent and legislator ideological preferences as well as the influence of political party affect legislator decision-making.
Literature Review
The overwhelming majority of research on Congress shows that the preferences of constituents are important to legislators. 11 However, these results are not unanimous.
While the largest body of research finds that legislators are influenced primarily by their constituents, many find that legislators' votes are most often driven by their personal ideology.
12
The vast majority of representation scholarship supports the assertion that supports this finding. While they find a large role for constituency on highly salient issues, they find little or no influence on non-salient issues.
These conflicting results may stem from incomplete representation models.
Scholars seldom account for the direct and indirect influences on legislator behavior for several reasons. 21 First, it is very difficult to get the data necessary to adequately test representation models. For instance, public opinion data relevant to the bill of interest are seldom available for all states and districts. Additionally, measures of legislator and party preferences are seldom independent. Second, the lack of consensus among scholars studying basic models has implicitly precluded adding layers of complexity to this research. However, these methods are beginning to be applied to examine the influence legislators have on constituents.
22
Constituents' influence is perhaps most noticeably absent when ideological measures are included in models of legislators' voting. Attempts to improve measures of ideology to allow for the natural variation of constituency effects through both simultaneous equations 23 and residualization processes 24 usually fail to demonstrate an increased role for constituency effects. 25 Critics respond to these studies by noting the problems inherent in operationalizing legislator ideology 26 . Poor operationalization of legislator ideology, since it cannot be directly measured, frequently results in an increased finding for ideology and a decreased finding for constituency. 27 Efforts to improve roll call based ideology measures have yet to overcome the basic problems identified by Jackson and
Kingdon.
28
Measurement problems also afflict measures of party influence. 29 Party is commonly measured using a dummy variable. This is so common that scholars seldom 4 provide any theoretical justification for their use of this measure. The development of measures of party influence has not kept pace with the recognition of the several ways party can influence legislators' decisions. However, when used along with measures of legislator ideology this measure produces severe regression inconsistency. 30 Use of the party dummy also confounds standard constituency measures even when there is no party effect. 31 In combination, the conflicting results seen in the representation literature are puzzling. Indeed, they lead Arnold to state: "....the effects of these electoral calculations will never show up in a study of representation that searches for correlations between measures of constituent opinion and legislators actual decisions." 
Data and Methods
Representation studies often overlook the complexity of the legislative process. 34 While some authors use simultaneous equation models 35 to clarify problems of measuring ideology, few scholars recognize the need to operationalize complex relationships to more completely describe the process. 36 One consequence is that the inter-relationship among the various influences on legislator behavior-the independent variables-is largely ignored.
- interests is hypothesized to affect legislators' roll call behavior. Controlling for these rival hypotheses allows a more complete and accurate evaluation of the influences on legislator behavior. 6 The hypothesis tests performed herein are strongly influenced by data availability. each of the variables is outlined in the section that follows.
The Statistical Model
The standard method for depicting the statistical relationship among variables in a structural equation model is through the use of a diagram. Lines show the paths between variables, and a star identifies the relationship as one that is to be estimated by the model.
The statistical model identifies the operationalization and specification of each of the variables included in the model and is shown in Figure 2 . 41 The covariance matrix needed to replicate these results is seen in Appendix A.
--Insert Figure 2--
Legislator behavior is measured using DW NOMINATE scores for the 102nd
Senate-a commonly used measure of legislator behavior. A vast literature examines the degree to which legislators are responsive to their constituents' economic interests. 53 The economic interests of constituents are reflected in two ways. First, the percentage of the state that belongs to a union reflects the socio- 59 Higher scores denote increased conservatism.
Constituent ideology is held to influence legislators both directly and through legislator ideology.
Results
The results of the model, depicted in Figure 3 , show that both legislator ideology and party significantly and directly influence legislator behavior. 60 Constituent ideology, PAC spending, union and race all fail to achieve direct statistical significance. The covariance between constituent preferences and economic measures are insignificant.
--Insert Figure 3--
However, there is also a large, indirect role for constituency. Constitue nt ideology is a significant predictor of legislator ideology. Decomposition of the variance demonstrates that the indirect effects of constituent ideology (through both legislator ideology and party) is also highly statistically significant (p<.001). 61 In addition, constituent ideology is indirectly a highly significant predictor of party (p<.001). As expected, legislator ideology has a significant influence on party. Examination of the fit indices suggest the model fits the data quite well. 62 Both the CFI at .924 and the IFI at .926, commonly used fit indices for small sample SEM models, exceed the .9 threshold for model fit.
Discussion and Analysis
The direct, statistically significant influence of legislator ideology and party concurrent with the significance of constituent ideology indirectly, go a long way toward explaining the contradictory results of past research. While legislators may not look directly toward constituents on any particular issue, their own attitudes and beliefs as well as their susceptibility to the arm twisting of party leaders is influenced by constituents.
This finding is consistent with a theory of representation offered by Arnold where legislators represent constituents when they avoid activating them. 63 Arnold develops this theory to explain how legislators can be responsive to an inattentive citizenry. Inasmuch as legislators incorporate constituents' preferences into their own ideological outlook and use these preferences to moderate the influence of party, their behavior is consistent with this theory.
It appears that the conflict within the literature results at least partly from model mis-specification. In particular, legislator behavior is influenced by both constituent and party pressures along with legislator ideology. Substantively, this finding is consistent with the diverse nature of representation observed by Miller and Stokes. 64 Clearly, additional research is needed to determine when legislators act consistently with different theories of representation.
More broadly, however, legislator behavior may best be described as 'dormant delegation' since only indirectly is constituent ideology a statistically significant influence on legislator behavior. This finding is important because few studies show a role for constituency after controlling for both party and ideology. These results suggest that constituent preferences condition these more direct influences on legislator behavior.
This work also speaks to the role of political party, narrowly defined.
The important role of party is also interesting. Indeed an entire subfield seems to have developed in an attempt to specify the role of party in studies of representation. 65 The implications of this study are twofold. First, these results suggest that the failure to find a role for party may stem from mismeasure. To the extent that the commonly used party dummy contains random measurement error, party effects are attenuated in regression models. 66 Second and consequently, these results suggest that scholars need to think more carefully about what they mean by party before throwing a dummy variable into a regression model. Most importantly, this finding suggests that the role of party should not be overlooked.
Parenthetically, this research poses a difficult problem for economists searching for legislator responsiveness to constituents' economic concerns. While studies of any single vote might vary, this study suggests that legislators do not rely on the economic characteristics of constituents directly. Neither of the economic indicators used in this study comes close to achieving statistical significance. This is not surprising as researchers find both that legislators are very good at predicting voter opinion and that voters behave sociotropically.
67

Conclusion
This study examines the complex interaction among elements that affect legislator behavior. The results suggest that the findings of past research are not incorrect--just incomplete. The failure to account for indirect influences on legislator behavior leads to the mistaken conclusion that constituency doesn't matter. These partial results have conflicting implications and are thus consistent with the conflicting results seen in the literature.
The results are consistent with the theory of representation outlined by Arnold--a theory explaining how and why legislators might be responsive to inattentive constituents. Constituents indirectly affect legislators' decisions. Clearly, scholars arguing against constituent influence are incorrect. Importantly, I find a role for party independent of legislator ideology. However, measures of constituents' economic interests fail to achieve statistical significance. The indicators used to predict ideology are taken only from 1991 and are based on a combined total of about 40 votes. So the overlap is small in percentage terms. Moreover, the party variable, while based on votes, does not use them directly but uses vote percentages, which helps to avoid the error problem identified above. Since the vote results used to calculate the percentages are interchangeable, the fact that they overlap is of no consequence since they are not directly used. Unlike the ideology and NOMINATE measures, every 'yea' vote counts the same regardless of the issue substance. 45 The substantive phenomenon being accounted for here is the degree to which party leaders pressure legislators to vote the party's preferred position. In contrast, the dummy variable accounts only for whether or not a legislator is a member of a particular party. Of course this assumes that the pressure on such members is constant. 46 Herron, "Interest." 47 Fiorina, "Constituency," Omitting a variable is the statistical equivalent of saying both that we know the variable's precise effect and that it is zero. Paradoxically this implies that we have more knowledge about the omitted variable than the included variables. 48 However, because party unity scores are multiplied by a dichotomous party dummy, the measure correlates at about .99 with the commonly used party dummy. 49 Importantly, the party dummy does not account for variation of party influence by leaders within parties on an individual vote basis. Clearly the degree to which leaders can successfully exert pressure depends on the electoral circumstance facing the legislator. The unity scores reflect this variation. 50 Stephen G. West, John F. 54 Using the NES sample ensures that any systematic bias in the constituency measures resulting from the sample frame is controlled. However, these measures are in practice virtually identical to the census data available from 1990. Since this study requires data from 1992, the NES seems appropriate since the census was dated by that time. 55 Fiorina, "Constituency,"; Goff and Grier, "On." 56 Bishin, "Constituency." 57 Goff and Grier, "On. 
